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PANEL 2: COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO 
ATTRACT AND RETAIN 
CORPORATIONS: LEGAL AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF STATE AND 
LOCAL TAX INCENTIVES AND 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
TAX INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT:PERSONAL(AND 
PESSIMISTIC) REFLECTIONS 
Edward A. Zelinsk/ 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this essay-state and local tax incentives for 
economic development-is a deeply personal subject for me. For 
almost twenty years, I served on the Board of Aldermen of New 
Haven, Connecticut, and then on that community's Board of Finance. 
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For all of those years, the city's finances were a central concern in my 
life. 1 
During these two decades, I shepherded through the legislative 
process many municipal property tax abatements awarded to 
developers in return for their promises to invest in the community. I 
now suffer from buyers' remorse as to these deals. 
In another incarnation, I have found myself in the middle of 
vigorous academic debate with those who assert that the dormant 
Commerce Clause rule of nondiscrimination prohibits state and local 
tax incentives designed to attract and retain investment. In that 
debate, I have argued that there is no constitutional barrier to such tax 
incentives. In particular, I have argued that it is doctrinally incoherent 
to view dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination as outlawing 
tax incentives while permitting economically and procedurally 
equivalent direct expenditures.2 I have also argued that the concept of 
dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination fails to explain which 
tax reductions are constitutionally prohibited and which are 
constitutionally permitted. 3 
My support for municipal tax abatements during my years as a city 
official, combined with my more recent writings about the 
constitutional permissibility of state and local tax incentives, might 
lead some to infer that I am today a supporter of such incentives to 
lure investment. The reality is more complex: As a matter of policy, I 
am now intensely skeptical of state and local tax incentive packages 
designed to stimulate economic development. Unfortunately, I am 
equally skeptical that there is a good way to police such incentives. 
I. PERSPECTIVES 
For purposes of this discussion, it is useful to contrast three 
different perspectives on state and local tax incentives. There are 
those who view such incentives as essentially benign phenomena. 
One rationale for this perception is that government is an insatiable 
Leviathan, which will unproductively consume whatever resources it 
1 For some earlier reflections on this experience, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and 
Future Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199 (2002). 
2 For some of the more recent interchanges in this debate, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Incoherence of Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination: A Reply to Professor Denning, 
77 Miss. L. J. 653 (2007); Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 196 (2007), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/ 
debate.php?did=7; Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of 
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NOTES 941 (2007), in 118 TAX 
NOTES 57 (July 2, 2007). 
3 See Zelinsky, Reply to Professor Denning, supra note 2. 
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can grab. If so, it is good whenever government is forced to reduce its 
grasp. The best known proponent of this rationale is Professor 
Friedman, whose skepticism of an ever-hungry public fisc led him to 
favor any tax reduction.4 
Professor Gillette offers more nuanced support for state and local 
tax incentives. In Professor Gillette's telling of the story, such 
incentives are economically efficient signaling devices that help firms 
locate where their presence is most beneficial. 5 
In contrast are those who oppose interjurisdictional tax 
competition. Professor Enrich is among the outspoken opponents of 
such tax competition.6 Professor Enrich brought the Cuno litigation, 
which raised a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the income 
and property tax incentives that Ohio and its municipalities granted to 
Daimler-Chrysler to locate a new plant in Toledo.7 That litigation 
stimulated much of the recent controversy about the dormant 
Commerce Clause concept of nondiscrimination. 8 Professor Shaviro 
is also skeptical about state and local tax competition.9 While 
Professors Enrich and Shaviro are careful to note that they favor ( or, 
at least, do not oppose) interjurisdictional competition as to tax rates, 
their writings suggest a dim view of other forms of tax 
competition. 
In between these polar positions are the mushy moderates like me. 
On the one hand, I find compelling the argument that tax competition 
among states and localities is healthy because such competition 
disciplines political officials and allows taxpayers to sort themselves 
among jurisdictions by taxpayers' tax and public spending 
preferences. On the other hand, targeted tax incentives are generally 
inefficient and unfair. 
4 See George F. Will, Stimulating Talk, Redux, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 64 ("Nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman .. . finally concluded that any tax cut of any size, at any time, for any 
purpose, should be supported because individuals spend money more productively than 
governments do and waiting to cut taices until government spending is cut is like waiting for 
Godot."). 
5 See Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce 
Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 486-87 (1997). 
6 See Peter D. Enrich, The Rise-And Perhaps The Fa/1-,1/ Business Tax Incentives, in 
THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 73 (David Brunori ed., 1998) [hereinafter FUTURE]; Peter D. 
Enrich, Saving The States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax 
Incentives/or Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996). 
7 See Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
8 For my own contribution to the Cuna oeuvre, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno: The 
Property Tax Issue, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives 
Decision Revisited, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 859 (Sept. 19, 2005), in 108 TAX NOTES 1569 
(September 26, 2005); Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A Critique, 34 ST. TAX 
NOTES 37 (2004), in 105 TAX NOTES 225 (2004). 
9 See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 895, 908--09 (1992). 
1148 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4 
II. PROBLEMS 
Much contemporary discussion of tax competition starts with the 
seminal argument of Charles Tiebout. Tiebout's initial insights have 
spawned a vast literature exploring the potential benefits of tax 
competition among municipalities and states. 10 In the Tiebout world, 
local taxes signal the price of local public services. In this world, 
taxpayers' mobility among jurisdictions permits them to sort 
themselves so that each taxpayer can reside in the jurisdiction with 
the combination of public services and taxes he or she finds 
congenial. The potential mobility of dissatisfied taxpayers disciplines 
local officials to restrain taxes and provide good public services to 
keep those taxpayers from leaving for adjacent jurisdictions with 
better tax climates and superior public services. The tax price of local 
public services also allows taxpayers as voters to compare their 
respective communities with surrounding jurisdictions. Such 
comparison enables taxpayers, as voters, to further discipline local 
officials if such officials perform poorly relative to their peers in other 
communities, and to reward such officials for superior performance in 
terms of taxes and public services. 
The Tiebout model is elegant. Perhaps more importantly, it was 
validated in practice by my years as a municipal official. Residents, 
both in their capacities as homeowners and as voters, are acutely 
sensitive to the tax price of living in their community as compared to 
the tax price of residing in neighboring municipalities. Local officials 
are aware of this sensitivity and continuously monitor the taxes they 
impose in relation to the taxes levied in adjacent jurisdictions. 
This analysis suggests that Tieboutian tax competition among 
jurisdictions is, in theory and in practice, desirable to discipline 
municipal officials and to permit taxpayers to reside in communities 
with tax and spending packages corresponding to such taxpayers' 
preferences. 
However, targeted tax incentives are a different matter. As I look 
back on the incentive packages that I helped to implement, I am 
troubled on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, 
there is, to start with, an inherent and irremediable information 
asymmetry in negotiations between state and local officials and the 
corporations and developers with which such officials bargain over 
tax incentives. The corporations and developers know their locational 
choices and preferences and have no reason to disclose these to the 
io See, e.g., THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY (William A. Fischel ed., 2006); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998). 
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officials with whom they are bargaining for tax benefits. Indeed, 
those negotiating for tax benefits from states and localities have every 
reason to hide their true choices and preferences. Consequently, the 
message corporations and developers advance in such negotiations-
give us a tax break or we will ignore (or leave) your community-is 
difficult for officials to evaluate. Perhaps the corporations and 
developers are bluffing; it is difficult for state and local officials 
negotiating with them to know, and politically risky for such officials 
to find out. 
Paralleling the informational imbalances between those seeking 
tax benefits and those dispensing tax benefits are the collective action 
problems of decentralized government. These problems represent the 
flip side of the interjurisdictional competition celebrated by the 
Tiebout model. If community X refuses to grant tax incentives to 
attract or retain a particular firm, community Y will. This makes it 
difficult for officials in community X to resist demands for tax 
largesse. Even if communities X and Y can enter into an effective 
nonaggression pact under which each will not compete against the 
other, there is always community Z and, waiting in the wings, 
communities A, B and C. 
States and localities are also handicapped in negotiations about tax 
incentives by the short time horizons of voters, which translates into 
short time horizons for the elected officials these voters pick. Put less 
charitably, voters and their representatives can be myopic in granting 
tax incentives. 
The costs of tax incentives often extend far into the future. For 
example, the property tax abatement challenged in Cuno lasted for ten 
years. 11 Few voters think that far in advijnce; even fewer elected 
officials do. Consequently, the political calculations strongly favor 
the granting of tax incentives since the apparent benefits are 
immediate and visible-the decision of corporations or developers to 
build and invest-while the costs in the form of reduced tax revenues 
fall heavily in the future when others will be in office. 
Finally, a significant portion of both the electorate and state and 
local officialdom succumbs to framing effects, erroneously perceiving 
tax incentives as different from economically and procedurally 
equivalent direct expenditure subsidies. 12 
11 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part, 547 
U.S. 332 (2006). 
12 Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 797 (2005). 
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In light of these procedural problems, the tax incentives states and 
localities grant are, as a substantive matter, often inefficient and 
typically unfair. This inefficiency is both technical and allocational. 13 
The tax benefits bestowed by states and municipalities are technically 
inefficient in that such benefits reward corporations and developers 
for investments they would have made anyway. State and local 
officials----outbargained because of their lack of information 
compared with the firms with which such officials are negotiating, 
pressured to grant tax breaks by the likelihood that other communities 
will grant such breaks if they do not, and compelled to produce the 
immediate benefits of investment in the community-award tax 
benefits for investments which would have occurred anyway. The 
public fisc is accordin$1Y reduced, but nothing is thereby 
accomplished for the local economy since these investments, 
nominally lured by tax benefits, would have occurred anyway. 
Moreover, tax incentives entail allocational inefficiency as 
taxpayers pay discrepant rates for the same public services. Because 
economic development incentives place part of the community's tax 
base off limits, the remainder of the community's tax base must be 
taxed more heavily to provide needed revenues. The higher tax rates 
that result interfere with the economic decisions of those more 
heavily taxed community members, which leads them, in turn, to 
demand the same relief granted to others. 
Consider, for example, a city approached by a developer who 
promises to construct a new office building in the city's downtown, 
but only if he is given property tax abatements for a number of years. 
Municipal officials (e.g., me) may suspect that the developer is 
bluffing and will in fact build even without the tax relief he is 
demanding. But such officials do not know this for sure and are likely 
to be risk averse: Who wants to be accused of driving investment and 
jobs from the community? And, the internal debate runs, if the city 
does not grant the tax abatement, a neighboring community will grant 
it and thereby obtain the proposed building. Since either way the city 
will not receive any taxes, it might as well get the investment. 
Subsequently, as the city's need for municipal revenue grows, the 
city must increase its tax rates, but it cannot increase the rates for the 
developer who built his new building in reliance on a long-term 
abatement. Tax rates consequently go up for other property owners, 
who find themselves increasing their rents to pay such taxes and 
13 On the distinction, in the context of tax incentives, between technical and allocational 
efficiency, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986). 
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deferring maintenance to reduce their operating costs. At the end of 
the day, older buildings are increasingly burdened with the costs of 
the community's public services, which hastens the decline of those 
structures. At a minimum, those older buildings find themselves at an 
artificial competitive disadvantage since they must pay property taxes 
that their new competitor does not. 
The community consequently finds itself on a treadmill with 
higher tax rates discouraging economic activity and more taxpayers 
threatening to depart in face of those rates. Moreover, increasingly 
burdened taxpayers can plausibly claim that they are treated unfairly 
since others, who received tax incentives, also get public services but 
do not pay ( or do not pay as much) for such services. Residential 
homeowners become increasingly demoralized by the higher tax rates 
needed to provide municipal services. 
No reader of the relevant economic and legal literature will be 
surprised by this scenario. For example, David Brunori observes the 
following: 
Commentators generally agree that incentives violate the 
most basic principles of sound tax policy. Incentives result in 
tax systems that are less accountable, less efficient, and less 
fair. Moreover, there is more than ample evidence that 
incentives do not work. Still, the use of tax incentives has 
increased primarily because political leaders lack the will to 
reject them. The political benefits of new jobs and increased 
economic activity are attractive inducements for offering 
incentives. 14 
In a similar vein, Professor Pomp notes that "tax incentives 
probably reward corporations for doing what they would have done 
anyway."15 Moreover, he writes, legislators "fear that being perceived 
as anti-business or anti-jobs is worse than being seen as promoting 
highly visible, albeit ineffective, incentives."16 
My contribution to the debate is that I have lived it. 
III. SOLUTIONS? 
All of these considerations lead me to a conclusion which is easy 
to state but, alas, is difficult to implement: I favor general, Tieboutian 
tax competition among jurisdictions to discipline political decision 
14 David Brunori, Introduction, in FUTURE, supra note 6, at 6. 
15 Richard D Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (and 
Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in FUTURE, supra note 6, at 54. 
16 Id. 
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makers, but I disfavor targeted tax incentives. The problem with this 
theoretically sound conclusion is that there is no feasible way to 
effectuate it. 
For the reasons already identified, we cannot rely on the self-
discipline of state and local officials to refrain from granting targeted 
tax incentives. The political rewards of granting such incentives-the 
ability to claim to have attracted investment and jobs-are immediate 
and visible. The economic costs of such incentives-reduced tax 
revenues-tend to fall in the future. The collective action problems of 
competing jurisdictions preclude effective nonaggression pacts 
among such jurisdictions. 
The alternative is for higher levels of government to impose tax 
incentive truces on lower level jurisdictions, i.e., state legislation to 
prevent municipalities from granting incentives in competition with 
each other; federal legislation, enacted pursuant to Congress's 
authority under the Commerce Clause, to similarly stop tax 
competition among the states. 
At the state level, the laws adopted in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Keio decision17 provide interesting examples. Just as 
some state legislatures have, after Keio, forbidden municipalities to 
exercise eminent domain power for economic development 
purposes, 18 state legislatures could proscribe municipalities from 
extending targeted tax breaks for economic development purposes. 
Similarly, Congress has, over the years, used its Commerce Clause 
authority to preclude states' exercise of their taxing powers in ways 
Congress has deemed harmful to the national economy. The best 
known of these federal laws is Public Law 86-272, which forbids 
states from imposing income taxes upon certain interstate sellers of 
tangible personal property. 19 Other federal laws aim to prevent 
discriminatory taxation of certain interstate transportation 
corporations20 while yet other federal laws preclude states and 
localities from taxing interstate e-commerce sales.21 During the Cuno 
litigation, some members of Congress proposed legislation to 
17 Keio v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
18 Ilya Somin, The Politics of Econimc Takings, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
19 An Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
381-391 (2000)). For the Supreme Court's construction of P.L. 86-272, see Wis. Dep't of 
Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992). 
20 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (2000) (forbidding states and localities from imposing any 
"tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing [interstate] transportation"); see also 49 
U.S.C. § 14502 (restricting the property taxation of "motor carrier transportation 
property" used in interstate commerce); 49 U.S.C. § 40116 (restricting the property 
taxation of "air carrier transportation property"). 
21 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1100-1308, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999) 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006 & Supp. 2008)). 
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authorize state tax incentives for economic development. 22 By the 
same token, Congress could enact legislation blocking state tax 
incentives for economic development purposes. 
Despite my skepticism of targeted tax incentives as a matter of 
policy, for two reasons I doubt that either federal or state legislation 
along these lines is appropriate. First, I fear that such legislation, as 
finally enacted, would prove to be the proverbial cure that is worse 
than the disease. Once the decision has been made at the state or 
federal level to restrain tax competition legislatively, it is politically 
naive to suppose that only targeted tax competition for economic 
development purposes will be outlawed. State and local officials 
prefer greater freedom to pursue their personal, political, and policy 
objectives. They will thus seek broader legislation that proscribes, not 
just the targeted tax competition that is troubling as a matter of policy, 
but the healthy Tieboutian competition that is a desirable feature of 
our decentralized system of state and local finance. 
On more than one occasion during my career as a local official, I 
would have welcomed participation in a state-enforced cartel of local 
governments and the consequent release from the discipline imposed 
by neighboring communities' tax rates. By the time legislation 
curtailing tax competition emerges from the state or federal legislative 
process, it would likely wind up inhibiting healthy, as well as 
undesirable, tax competition. 
Of course, those who believe that all tax competition is good ( or 
bad) do not need to distinguish in this way. But for those of us who 
believe that Tiebout tax competition is desirable but targeted tax 
incentives are not, it is a real danger that legislation initially aimed at 
the latter will end up proscribing the former. 
Second, even if there is agreement to ban targeted tax incentives 
for economic development purposes without inhibiting more 
generalized and desirable forms of tax competition, I am skeptical 
that there are workable standards to implement such agreement. To 
paraphrase Justice Stewart, I know the targeted tax incentives I 
oppose when I see them.23 That, however, does not mean that I can 
formulate a workable legal test to identify such incentives. 
Suppose, for example, that a state legislature outlaws any 
municipal tax policy enacted to stimulate economic development. 
Such a standard is overly broad. Communities reduce their general tax 
rates, inter alia, to create more favorable tax environments for 
22 Walter Hellerstein, Cuno and Congress: An Analysis of Proposed Federal Legislation 
Authorizing State Economic Development Incentives, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 73 (2006). 
23 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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business. Such tax rate reductions lie at the core of the Tiebout vision 
of beneficial tax competition among jurisdictions. 
Suppose that the legislature instead proscribes all tax policies 
aimed at a single taxpayer. Intuitively, that standard is initially 
compelling. However, any tax policy can be made to appear generally 
available to a class of taxpayers, e.g., a property tax abatement for 
everyone who will construct a twenty story office building within the 
next twelve months. We could, in such cases, ask the courts to probe 
the legislative motivation for such legislation to determine if there 
is a subjective intent to help a particular taxpayer. However, I am 
skeptical that such judicial policing is feasible or desirable. At 
best, such policing is likely to lead to a continuing cat-and-mouse 
game whereby legislators adopt more elaborate and more opaque 
statutory formulas to obscure the intent to benefit a single taxpayer. 
Or suppose that Congress outlaws states with income taxes from 
extending accelerated depreciation deductions for economic 
development purposes. Here again there is a serious problem: Some 
believe accelerated depreciation more accurately reflects the 
economic decline of tangible property than do slower forms of 
depreciation. 24 If so, there is no workable standard distinguishing the 
state legislature that adopts accelerated depreciation as a targeted tax 
subsidy from the legislature that embraces such depreciation as the 
best way to measure firms' net incomes. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, these considerations lead me to doubt that an 
acceptable solution to the problem of targeted tax incentives can be 
articulated or implemented. 
My skepticism about targeted tax incentives does not imply that 
state and local governments have no constructive role bolstering their 
respective economies. To the contrary, by providing at reasonable 
cost good public services which make communities safe, clean, 
affordable, well-educated and well-governed, states and 
municipalities make themselves desirable places to live and invest. 
The political dilemma is that the electoral costs of restraining public 
spending are typically acute and short-term, while the benefits of 
efficient and productive government may not manifest themselves 
until well into the future. This makes it difficult for elected officials to 
pursue sensible business-attracting policies for the long-run. Such 
political calculations reinforce the tendency of officials to pursue the 
24 See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation- Tax Expenditure or Proper 
Allowance/or Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. I (1979). 
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kind of targeted tax incentives that yield apparent short-term 
benefits while delaying the fiscal and economic costs until later. 
I wish I could end this personal and pessimistic essay on a high 
note, perhaps by proposing a solution or, more modestly, by 
suggesting the direction in which we might search for a solution. 
Instead, I must end with the admonition that not all problems have 
acceptable solutions and, at least for the foreseeable future, the 
problem of targeted tax incentives for economic development is one 
of these. 
